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VIRTUAL SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS 
ELIZABETH BOROS 1 
ABSTRACT 
Electronic communication impacts how widely-held 
corporations conduct shareholder meetings.  For example, 
technology has facilitated such options as electronic proxy voting, 
remote electronic voting, and “virtual meetings.” This iBrief 
examines the idea of “virtual meetings” and argues that they 
should not entirely replace physical meetings unless an electronic 
solution can be devised which replicates the face-to-face 
accountability of management to retail shareholders. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 This iBrief examines the impact of electronic communication on the 
way in which corporations conduct shareholder meetings.  Specifically, it 
focuses on widely-held public corporations because it is with respect to 
these entities that e-commerce techniques could have the greatest impact on 
shareholder participation. 
AREAS OF IMPACT 
¶2 Electronic communication has impacted shareholder meetings in 
three realms, namely: 
• Electronic proxy voting: the electronic authentication 
and submission of proxy appointments to the 
corporation; 
• Remote (direct) electronic voting: shareholders voting 
in their own name, although not physically attending 
the meeting; and  
• Virtual meetings: “meetings” that do not involve a 
physical gathering, but which take place in an 
electronic form, such as via a remote ballot or a 
corporation-sponsored electronic bulletin board. 
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A. Electronic Proxy Voting 
¶3 Electronic proxy voting is the least controversial of these three 
issues.  As noted above, the electronic component of electronic proxy 
voting relates both to the authentication of the appointment (which 
generally involves entering a PIN into a telephone keypad or web-based 
form, rather than a handwritten signature) and to the submission of that 
appointment to the corporation (via telephone or the Internet).  Electronic 
proxy voting raises generic e-commerce issues—the meanings of 
“signature” and “delivery”—rather than corporate law issues.  This method 
raises little controversy, provided it is offered as an option to shareholders,  
and does not raise the prospect of depriving shareholders of the opportunity 
to participate because of differential access to technology.  However, a 
corporation may be concerned that electronically-submitted votes are 
invalid, thereby opening corporate resolutions to challenge.   
¶4 Commentators, such as Verdun Edgtton, have argued that the law 
would have been able to cope with this new “challenge” without statutory 
changes because corporations are able to make their own provisions for the 
authentication and submission of proxy appointments in their articles of 
incorporation, or equivalent constitutional documents.2  In the same way 
that courts have adjusted to accommodate the telegraph, the fax machine, 
the telephone conference, and the video conference, courts would also, over 
time, be able to assimilate electronic signature and electronic delivery as 
those concepts become readily accepted in the community.3  However, 
perhaps partly because of wider concerns about the effectiveness of 
electronic modes of “signature,” and partly because of the business 
community’s desire for certainty, many countries have resorted to 
legislation to clarify the validity of electronic proxy votes.4 
                                                     
2 Verdun Edgtton, Appointment of Proxies by Electronic Communication: Do 
Companies Have to Wait for Enabling Legislation?, 21 COMPANY LAWYER 294, 
298 (2000). 
3 Id. 
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth Boros, Corporate Governance in Cyberspace:  Who Stands 
to Gain What from the Virtual Meeting?, 3 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 
STUDIES 149, 150-55 (2003) (detailing UK, Australian and US reforms); Eddy 
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European developments); JESPER LAU HANSEN, FOCUS:  THE LISTED COMPANIES 
AND THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 1 (Copenhagen Stock Exchange, Focus 
No. 62, Sept. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.cse.dk/kf/kf_pressemeddelelser?languageID=1&c=Page&cid=10346
98850162&contentid=1062141824343 (last visited July 14, 2004) (detailing 
Danish developments). 
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B. Remote Electronic Voting 
¶5 Remote electronic voting is more difficult to categorize than 
electronic proxy voting because it can take a number of different forms.  
Many corporations now webcast their annual meetings in real time, and 
some offer remotely-located shareholders the opportunity to “participate” in 
the meeting by submitting questions via email.5  Where this is combined 
with proxy voting it poses little challenge to the traditional concept of a 
meeting.  The issue becomes more complicated where shareholders who are 
not “present”—in person or by proxy—are able to vote.  At this point, 
remote electronic voting merges with virtual meetings.   
C. Virtual Meetings 
¶6 There are multiple issues that arise with “virtual meetings,” namely 
what is meant by the term “virtual meeting,” what a “meeting” really is, and 
why corporations hold them. 
1. Why Hold Meetings? 
¶7 The general meeting of shareholders, as it is currently practiced in 
widely-held public corporations, leaves a lot to be desired.  These meetings 
(at least in Australia and the UK) are poorly attended by institutional 
shareholders, most of whom regard visits by analysts and direct contact with 
management as more effective ways to influence the governance and 
business direction of corporations in their portfolios.6  The concerns of 
institutional shareholders are usually dealt with before the general meeting, 
and to the extent that issues do arise for a vote at the meeting, the outcome 
will generally have been determined by proxy votes lodged by institutional 
shareholders well in advance of the meeting.7  The other main category of 
shareholders, retail shareholders, is rationally apathetic and very few attend 
                                                     
5 SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW AND 
REGULATION 7-9 (John F. Olson & Harvey L. Pitt eds., Glasser LegalWorks, 
1997). 
6 See Shareholder Activism Among Fund Managers:  Policy and Practice (Inv. 
& Fin. Servs. Ass’n Ltd.), July 2003, at 10-12 (regarding Australian 
shareholders), available at 
http://www.ifsa.com.au/IFSAWeb/Attach.nsf/Attachments/Board+Committee+-
+Investment~Corporate+Governance~2001_0314_IFSA+Industry+overview%2
Epdf/$File/2001_0314_IFSA+Industry+overview.pdf (last visited July 14, 
2004); Paul Myners, Institutional Investment in the UK:  A Review, March 2001, 
at ¶ 5.84 (regarding UK shareholders), at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media//843F0/31.pdf (last visited July 14, 2004). 
7 See Graeme James, When companies incur the wrath of angry shareholders, 
COURIER MAIL, Oct. 20, 2001, at 70. 
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meetings or vote.8  Most could not attend even if they wished because 
meetings are held during business hours and often far from the 
shareholders’ homes.  Therefore, the few individuals who do attend are 
likely to be unrepresentative of the general body of shareholders.  
Furthermore, the financial cost to the corporation of convening a meeting 
with a substantial number of shareholders can be very high.9 
¶8 However, it is not hard to find defenders of the general meeting.  
Corporate law in most jurisdictions still requires public corporations to hold 
an annual meeting.10  Delaware is an exception,11 but even there New York 
Stock Exchange listing rules require listed corporations to hold annual 
meetings.12  Moreover, even in Delaware, shareholders are able to act 
without a meeting only with the written consent of the same percentage of 
shareholders as of votes that would have been required to approve the action 
at an actual meeting.13  At first sight this written consent option seems quite 
“anti-meeting,” but considering how few shareholders attend or vote (either 
in person or by proxy) at a normal meeting, obtaining an absolute majority 
                                                     
8 See, e.g., Gabrielle Costa, Investor Activism on the Rise, THE AGE, Dec. 16, 
2003, at Business 3 (citing findings of a retail shareholder survey, 
“[T]raditionally, ‘the number of shareholders voting at company meetings has 
barely exceeded 10 percent.’”), available at 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336887971.html?from=story
rhs&oneclick =true (last visited July 14, 2004).  This history of rational apathy 
has led to efforts by regulators and shareholder associations to encourage greater 
participation.  See, e.g., Shareholders – have your say (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and Australian Shareholders Association joint 
publication), at 
http://www.asic.gov.au/fido/fido.nsf/byid/7B41A175B275EDF4CA256B030083
5233?opendocument (last visited July 14, 2004). 
9 Stephen Bottomley, The Role of Shareholders’ Meetings in Improving 
Corporate Governance, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. CTR. FOR COMMERCIAL LAW, at 
45 (Sept. 2003) (finding that the median cost of holding an annual general 
meeting in Australia was AU$15,000, and the average cost was AU$44,042).  
The cost in very widely-held corporations may, however, be even higher.  See 
Nat’l Roads and Motorists’ Ass’n Ltd. v. Snodgrass, (2002) 42 A.C.S.R. 371, 
373 (the court accepted an estimate of between AU$1.4m and AU$2.6m as a 
guide to the cost to plaintiff of convening a meeting).   
10 E.g., Corporations Act, 2001, c. 2G, § 250N (Austl.); Companies Act, 1985, c. 
6, § 366 (U.K.). 
11 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2003) (amendments adopted in 1997 
authorize the use of stockholder consents in lieu of an annual meeting in limited 
circumstances). 
12 See, e.g., Rule 302.00, New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, 
available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_section.html (last visited July 14, 
2004). 
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2003). 
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of the entire body of shareholders by this written procedure is likely to 
require gathering many more votes than simply securing a mere majority of 
those present at a meeting. 
¶9 Courts have noted that a physical gathering provides a forum for 
deliberation and confrontation.14  Commentators have similarly observed 
that the feature of confrontation or “face-to-face accountability” is 
particularly valuable to retail shareholders.15  Courts and commentators both 
also note that views expressed at a meeting by minority shareholders can 
change the course of corporate policy, even if they do not carry the vote.16  
For example, a corporation may be keen to head off potential damage to its 
reputation stemming from environmental protests or other wider-
stakeholder concerns.17  As a result, the trend in the UK and Australia is not 
to disband the meeting, but rather to find ways to revive it, by encouraging18 
or requiring19 institutional shareholders to participate more actively, and by 
suggesting modest improvements to the way meetings are conducted, such 
as clearer notices of meeting and better handled shareholder 
communication.20   
                                                     
14 E.g., Hoschett v TSI Int’l Software Ltd, 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
15 See Responses of GLB Pitt, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland, ICSA and the Association of Investment Trust Companies to The 
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy:  Company General Meetings and Shareholder 
Communication, Question 1 (URN 99/1144, DTI, Oct. 1999), at 10, available at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/reviews/condocs.htm (last visited July 14, 2004). 
16 E.g., Re Compaction Systems Pty Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 477, Re HR Harmer 
Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62, Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365; GREG BATEMAN, 
COMPANY MEETINGS:  WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW V-VI (Butterworths, 2001) 
(comments of Justice R. P. Austin, Supreme Court of New South Wales). 
17 See, e.g., Boros, supra note 4, at 178 n.159.  See also Sarah Murray, Rebel 
Investors Make Themselves Heard, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at 8, 
available at 2003 WL 71588521.  
18 See Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, at 20, (July 2003), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf (last visited July 14, 
2004) (for information about the UK); Leon Gettler, Thumbs Down for Funds 
Plan, THE AGE, Mar. 26, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 14780337 (for 
information about Australia). 
19 Interpretive bulletin relating to statement of investment policy, including 
proxy voting policy or guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994) (US 
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin on the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA)), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/EBSA/Title_29/Part_2509/29CFR2509.94-2.htm 
(last visited July 14, 2004).  See also Myners, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 79, 5.92. 
20 Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council, Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, at 39-41, 
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¶10 In an in-depth theoretical analysis of the necessity for meetings, 
Ralph Simmonds takes the argument in favor of meetings a step further and 
identifies four interconnected reasons for mandating annual meetings for 
public corporations: 
• the pervasiveness of positional conflicts of interest 
(i.e., managers’ interests in maintaining and enhancing 
their positions); 
• the value of deliberative assemblies, such as annual 
meetings, in addressing this conflict; 
• the unlikelihood that provisions for assemblies would 
be generally accepted without mandatory rules; and 
• the unlikelihood that market effects would properly 
compensate for the lack of such provisions.21 
2. What is a Meeting? 
¶11 If the value of a meeting is the forum it provides for confrontation, 
debate, and deliberation, must it take the form of a traditional physical 
gathering? 
¶12 The answer is that the meeting probably need not take a traditional 
form if the corporation has a small number of shareholders, or the 
shareholders are confined to a small number of venues designated by the 
corporation.  In these cases, it may be possible to connect the venues by 
video conference and conduct the meeting as if all members were present in 
one room.   
¶13 The limited case law on this topic suggests that such an approach 
would not expose the meetings to a legal challenge.  For example, the case 
law regarding directors’ meetings illustrates an acceptance by some courts 
that any forum constituting a meeting of the minds will count as a meeting, 
even if it takes place using technology (such as a telephone or video 
conference).22  This position was formalized by statute in many states, such 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.asx.com.au/about/CorporateGovernance_AA2.shtm (last visited July 
14, 2004). 
21 Ralph Simmonds, Why must we meet?  Thinking about why shareholders 
meetings are required, 19 COMPANY & SECURITIES LAW JOURNAL 506, 515-16 
(2001). 
22 See, e.g., Freedom Oil Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Board, 655 N.E.2d 1184 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that administrative agencies have wide latitude to 
accomplish their official duties, and that meeting by telephone conference call 
did not violate Illinois open meetings laws); cf., e.g., Swiss Screens (Austl.) Pty 
Ltd & Anor v. Burgess & Ors (1987) 11 ACLR 756 (holding that “any event, 
even most fleeting, in which two directors . . . reach concurrence in taking some 
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as Delaware.23  Furthermore, the English Court of Appeal has also accepted 
the validity of shareholder meetings held in several rooms connected by 
audio/visual links that enable attendees to see and hear what takes place in 
each room,24 and the Delaware General Corporation Law clarifies the 
common law position that meetings held in multiple venues are valid.25 
¶14 It is legally possible in Delaware to go a step further and hold a 
shareholder meeting without a physical venue.26  But, practically, it is much 
more difficult to conceive of a way to replicate the elements of 
confrontation, debate, and deliberation in an electronic environment where 
there is a large number of shareholders and the corporation has no control 
over their location.  The few meetings held in Delaware under the above-
cited provision do not appear to have involved real time participation by 
large numbers of widely-dispersed shareholders.27 
¶15 To date, only two corporations have reportedly taken advantage of 
the ability to hold a virtual meeting:  Inforte Corp., in 2001, and Ciber Inc., 
in 2002.  In the case of Inforte Corp., no voting took place at the meeting,28 
and it is not clear whether any questions were asked (although the 
corporation was prepared to answer questions emailed to its investor 
relations address).29  Although Inforte Corp. repeated this experiment the 
following year, there are no press reports on how that meeting was 
conducted.  Similarly, there are no reports regarding the conduct of Ciber 
Inc.’s virtual meeting.  However, in a report written in advance of the Ciber 
meeting, the corporation expressed the hope that more than 10 of its 28,000-
plus shareholders would attend.30   
                                                                                                                       
course in the company’s affairs can be part of their management of the business 
of the company, and can be described with accuracy as a meeting of the 
directors and as a proceeding at such a meeting”). 
23 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i) (2003). 
24 E.g., Byng v London Life Ass’n Ltd., 1990 Ch. 170, 183 (C.A.). 
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(2).  
26  Id. 
27  See infra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
28 Tami Kamarauskas, Inforte Corporation Hosts Virtual Shareholder Meeting, 
5 No. 5 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 20 
(Oct. 2001) (97% of the shares were voted by fax before the meeting).   
29 Compare id., with Broc Romanek, Technology Trends for 2002, 5 No 8 
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM:  SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 25, Jan. 2002, 
and Broc Romanek, Electronic-Only Shareholders’ Meetings: Examining the 
Considerations, 4 No 2 E-SECURITIES 3, Oct. 2001. 
30 Janet Forgrieve, Ciber to Hold Virtual Shareholder Meeting; Greenwood 
Village Company Looks to Cyberspace to Draw Interest in Meeting, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002, at 5B (according to the CEO, “[o]urs have 
never been attended by more than 10 people who were not either employees or 
accounting or legal advisors to us”). 
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¶16 The limited number of shareholders involved in these two examples 
suggests that they do not provide a template for an electronic forum offering 
the opportunity for confrontation, debate, and deliberation in a widely-held 
corporation.  Nor do these examples provide a basis for drawing any 
conclusions regarding the likely extent of the use of such provisions in the 
future.  They do, however, suggest that practical issues, such as 
satisfactorily identifying shareholders and providing for real time 
participation on a mass scale, are likely to deter corporations with a large 
number of shareholders from experimenting with virtual meetings. 
¶17 Admittedly, the Delaware law does not preserve all elements of the 
common law concept of “meeting.”  By referring to “proceedings of the 
meeting,” the statute arguably requires some kind of debate and 
deliberation.  This might, for example, be satisfied by a “meeting” held via 
a company-sponsored bulletin board.  On the other hand, it would appear 
not to be satisfied by a ballot held without any exchange of views. 
¶18 However, Delaware law does not appear to require the forum to 
provide an electronic analogy of confrontation.  A bulletin board, for 
example, would not be able to convey the body language of the person 
answering the question.31  As a consequence, the Delaware provision 
permitting virtual meetings has drawn a hostile response from those 
concerned that it removes the element of face-to-face accountability so 
valued by retail shareholders.32  Such sentiments also resulted in the 
abandonment of a legislative proposal which would have permitted virtual 
meetings in Massachusetts.33 
3. Reaching Decisions Without a Meeting? 
¶19 As noted above, Delaware law contains a written consent option to 
allow stockholders to reach decisions without a meeting in limited 
situations, requiring the same percentage of votes necessary to approve the 
action at an actual meeting.34  Although this procedure does not involve 
electronic communications directly, it is relevant to this discussion because 
it provides a mechanism for reaching a corporate decision by means other 
than a traditional physical gathering.   
¶20 The procedure is qualitatively different from the common law 
concept of a meeting, which offers the potential for both deliberation and 
face-to-face accountability, except in cases of unanimous agreement.35  The 
                                                     
31 See Simmonds, supra note 21, at 517 n.116. 
32 See, e.g., Forgrieve, supra note 30. 
33 Ralph Ranalli, Corporate Meetings Bill is Shelved, Shareholder Group Raps 
Online Forums, THE BOSTON GLOBE, August 24, 2001, at B.1. 
34 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2003). 
35 See Hoschett v TSI Int’l Software Ltd, 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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editors of Delaware Corporation Law and Practice note that it was 
originally intended as a procedural reform to remove red tape, but had the 
unintended consequence of potentially disadvantaging management in 
control contests. 36  As a result, corporations often change this default rule in 
their articles of incorporation, resulting in the paradoxical consequence that 
physical gatherings will generally be held, even in Delaware.37 
CONCLUSION 
¶21 There is great potential for electronic communication to enhance 
the traditional physical gathering by providing a low-cost and 
geographically unlimited means for many more shareholders to participate.  
Such means may also have the incidental benefit of providing an auditable 
trail of how voting rights are exercised, which may be particularly valuable 
to institutional shareholders.  However, these benefits can be achieved by 
means short of a completely virtual meeting, such as through a combination 
of webcasting the physical gathering and enabling remote observers to 
participate by emailing questions, and/or voting electronically in real time.   
¶22 There is also potential for both the virtual meeting and the written 
consent option to be detrimental to retail shareholders because both 
procedures remove the face-to-face accountability of management to 
shareholders.  Additionally, the written consent procedure also removes the 
element of deliberation that carries with it the small, but nevertheless 
important, possibility that sentiments expressed by shareholders will 
influence corporate plans even if overridden by the proxy votes.   
¶23 The time and cost savings of these options may seem attractive, 
particularly where the items on the agenda are not contentious, but 
corporations considering employing these procedures should weigh the 
benefits against the potentially adverse consequences of shareholder 
hostility.38  In the end, the pitfalls are not a reason to flatly reject the 
potential benefits that virtual meetings can offer, particularly in terms of 
greater levels of shareholder participation, but they serve as arguments that 
virtual meetings should not entirely replace physical meetings in widely-
held public corporations until an electronic equivalent can be devised for 
the face-to-face accountability of management to retail shareholders and the 
opportunity for deliberation currently offered by physical gatherings. 
36 2-31 DEL. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE § 31.01 (2003) (“. . . Section 228 
permits insurgent groups to establish the time frame for a control contest, and 
such a group, by choosing its time propitiously, may obtain the upper hand.”). 
37 Charles R. T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other 
Business Associations:  Cases and Materials 151 (4th ed. 2003). 
38 See Daniel Adam Birnhak, Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law 
Anomalies or the Future of Governance?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
423, 445-46 (2003). 
